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Executive summary: Distilling Key Learning across IDRC’s Program-Led Evaluations 
Purpose and scope of this project
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) funds research aimed at reducing poverty and improving lives in developing nations. 
Committed to continuously learning from both the successes and challenges of its programming, IDRC commissions a wide variety of program-led 
evaluations from third-party firms. IDRC’s Policy and Evaluation Division (POEV) commissioned Cathexis Consulting to conduct a systematic meta-
analysis of IDRC’s program-led evaluations in order to capture and support learning about strengths and shortfalls of IDRC’s programming approach 
under the 2015-2020 strategic cycle. The analysis of recurring and strategically relevant lessons and findings across IDRC’s program-led evaluations will 
also help guide strategic planning beyond 2020. The review included 23 significant evaluations commissioned by IDRC programs (including externally 
funded programs) and completed during the 2015-2020 strategic period; a complete list of evaluations reviewed is provided in Annex A.
This exercise has focused on eight overarching areas of interest, which are listed as the titles of the boxes on this and the following page. The areas of 
interest presented on this page are IDRC’s 2015-2020 strategic objectives. The remaining five areas of interest, presented on the next page, are 
additional areas of interest to IDRC.
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1. Achieving impact at scale
Key findings:
 Some IDRC projects are 
deliberately built to facilitate 
scaling of promising interventions.
 The private sector can be a 
valuable partner in scaling 
innovations in some cases, but 
grantees often have limited 
capacity to engage with private 
sector actors.
 Evaluating scalability (and KT more 
generally) within project-funding 
timelines usually requires 
assessing likely future uptake. 
There are promising methods of 
assessing this in the programs 
included in this study.
2. Building leaders
Key findings:
 Deliberate mechanisms to build individual 
leaders and leading organizations are 
integrated into all programs in scope.
 The “greenhouse” approach (holistic, 
wraparound, on-site support) to building 
emerging leaders may be particularly 
effective.
 North-South research teams benefit both 
sides. Equality is essential, and IDRC has 
found ways to ensure it.
 Core funding can provide the predictability 
and flexibility needed for leading 
organizations to build their own capacity
 Sustaining leadership beyond the grant 
period requires increasing grantees’ capacity 
to secure their own funding, but the results 
of this effort have been uneven.
3. Being the partner of choice
Key findings:
 Being the partner of choice can 
mean being the funder of choice 
(from grantees’ perspective) or the 
co-funder of choice (from other 
funders’ perspective). Both are 
important, and mutually reinforce 
each other.
 IDRC’s flexibility (including 
funding flexibility) can make it the 
funder of choice.
 IDRC’s Grants+ approach 
(extensive supports to grantees) 
can make it the funder (and co-
funder) of choice.
 Co-funding and parallel funding 
arrangements each have 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Further investigation in this area is 
needed.
Topics for future evaluation and learning
This exercise uncovered a number of areas where learning was limited due to 
a lack of in-depth examination by the evaluation reports, and/or use of 
inconsistent terminology. The following areas would benefit from further 
investigation (through evaluation or other means):
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5. Designing programs for collaboration, 
learning, and synthesis
 Most IDRC programs in scope are deliberately 
designed to support collaboration, learning, and 
synthesis. IDRC has experimented with a variety of 
ways of supporting this.
 Common research questions and timelines (a 
“cohort” in the strong sense) may be particularly 
effective at leading to collaboration, learning, and 
synthesis.
 Consortia can foster collaboration across 
boundaries, create convening power and build 
individual leaders and leading organizations.
 In-person meetings between grantees are valuable 
for fostering cross-project and South-South 
learning.
7. Supporting knowledge translation and policy/practice influence
 IDRC works to facilitate knowledge translation and policy/practice 
influence in numerous ways.
 Influence on policy and practice is sometimes best pursued through 
alternative policy spaces and nontraditional influencers. Some grantees 
need support in accessing these spaces.
 Bringing the intended users of the research into the research team from the 
beginning may be the surest way to create research demand and maximize 
uptake.
 The design of the Call for Proposals process can impact research quality and 
uptake. A two-stage Call for Proposals process with financial support to 
shortlisted applicants is a promising approach.
 IDRC programs contribute to outcomes beyond policy influence. These 
include field building, thought leadership, and awareness raising of lesser-
known topics.
6. Building flexibility into IDRC programs 
through funding mechanisms
 Opportunity funds and synergy funds work well to 
keep programs nimble.
 In the programs reviewed, there are other 
promising funding mechanisms that facilitate 
flexibility.
 Granter-grantee trust makes flexible funding work. 
IDRC excels at this.
4. Integrating gender and equity considerations 
into programming
 Gender considerations, dimensions of equity 
beyond gender, and an intersectional approach to 
gender have often not been systematically 
integrated into programs and their evaluations, 
but there is evidence that this is improving. 
8. Knowledge management
 Some programs lack clear, strategic knowledge management plans. This is a 
key gap.
 A useful resource hub for development research is accessible, well 
organized, quality-assured, and includes both country-specific and non-
country-specific resources.
 Optimal scale and justification 
for scaling
 Increasing grantees’ capacity to 
secure their own funding
 Co-funding partnerships: 
genesis, successes, challenges
 Co-funding vs. parallel funding: 
advantages, disadvantages
 Equity considerations beyond 
gender
 Ways of designing programs for 
collaboration, learning, 
synthesis
 Flexible funding mechanisms
 Designing Calls for Proposals
About this project
Purpose and methods of this project
Purpose
IDRC employs a strategic and decentralized system of evaluations at the 
organizational, program, and project levels. Evaluations commissioned by 
IDRC programs normally target staff of the program in question and IDRC 
management as key users. However, looking across these evaluations, 
there are many examples of findings that could be strategically relevant 
across programs more broadly. While ad hoc efforts are in place to 
promote internal sharing of findings and key lessons, these findings and 
lessons present an opportunity for deeper systematic analyses or 
distillation
In June 2019, IDRC contracted Cathexis Consulting to complete this meta-
analysis of program-led evaluations. The key findings that emerge will 
provide insights and guide future program decision making. Rather than a 
summary of all evaluation findings—which are far too numerous to include 
in a single, digestible document—the analysis was intended to identify the 
most significant and actionable findings that could inform future program 
design.
Methods
This project followed a collaborative process, as follows:
 IDRC’s Policy and Evaluation (POEV) division identified 23 evaluations 
(covering 20 different programs or projects) to be analyzed (see next 
page)
 The Cathexis team reviewed background and reference documents
 Cathexis and POEV collaboratively built a coding key to guide the 
analysis
 Cathexis used NVivo qualitative analysis software to analyze evaluation 
reports according to the coding key, adding additional codes as needed
 Cathexis identified key findings of cross-program relevance: those that 
appeared in many evaluations, or appeared in fewer but seemed highly 
significant
 Cathexis and POEV participated in a sensemaking session to co-
interpret the findings
 Cathexis wrote a final report and presented the results to IDRC staff in 
October 2019.
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Overarching areas of interest
This project focused on eight overarching areas of 
interest. The first three are IDRC’s 2015-2020 strategic 
objectives. The other five are additional areas of 
strategic interest to IDRC.
The areas of interest are as follows:
1. Achieving impact at scale
2. Building leaders 
3. Being the partner of choice
4. Integrating gender and equity 
considerations into programming 
5. Designing programs for collaboration, 
learning and synthesis
6. Building flexibility into IDRC programs 
through funding mechanisms











































































The diagram below is an overview of the IDRC’s Programs and Partnerships Branch. Programs/projects for which evaluations were analyzed as part of 
the present meta-analysis exercise are indicated with a gold outline. In total, 23 evaluations were reviewed.
For further details on the evaluations that were analyzed, including the meanings of each acronym, see Annexes A and B. For a list of background and 
reference documents consulted, see Annex C. 
Key findings
1. Achieving impact at scale
Key finding: Some IDRC projects are deliberately built to 
facilitate scaling of promising interventions.
In the evaluations in scope, projects worked to achieve scale at 
multiple levels, including community, district, national, regional, and 
even global scale (e.g. some GJ projects, and elements of OD4D). 
What is scaled may be a policy, program, behavior/practice/skill, 
product/technology, research methodology, or combination of the 
above. Scaling often occurs by ground-truthing innovations and 
refining them through a piloting process, then assessing the extent 
to which they can be replicated in other places, contexts, and 
populations (DIF-H, CARIAA, CIFSRF).
A few examples of projects designed for scaling are given below:
 Program/product/practice scaled to sub-national level: CIFSRF 
included a project (Scaling Up the Production of More Nutritious 
Yellow Potatoes in Colombia) to introduce improved varieties of 
potatoes in rural communities in Colombia, while also 
encouraging sustainable agricultural practices. After this 
innovation was piloted in five communities, a provincial 
government in Colombia has committed to scaling it to a further 
13 communities.
 Technology scaled to a national level: IRCI included a project 
(Breaking the Barriers to Internet Access) that developed data 
mining technology to make agricultural product prices more 
easily accessible to farmers. This led to the founding of an 
associated technology companies with offices in Canada and 
China, and the technology was adopted by the Chinese Weather 
Bureau and Ministry of Agriculture.
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Nonetheless, evaluations showed that there 
have been severe challenges when it comes to 
grantees engaging with private sector actors, 
and many missed opportunities:
 Grantees in the CC program usually had 
virtually no knowledge and experience 
with the private sector and gave it little or 
no thought; they did not engage even 
when there were apparently obvious 
opportunities for partnership. Grantees 
often harboured a prejudice against the 
private sector and viewed it as 
synonymous with large corporations. There 
was also a mismatch between the slower 
pace of academia and the quicker pace of 
business. As a result, while the CC program 
had some successes with the private sector 
(especially with the insurance and 
investment industries), there was much 
less success here than there was with the 
public sector.
 CARIAA and DIF-H grantees lacked the 
business acumen and private sector 
connections needed to attract interest 
from investors for their innovations.
 CIFSRF grantees had success with small-
scale private actors (entrepreneurs, small 
businesses, farmers’ associations, etc.), but 
only a moderate amount from national 
private actors, and very little from 
multinational private actors. This was in 
spite of significant outreach to the private 
actors through engaging them as partners, 
meeting with them, presenting findings, 
and developing research outputs intended 
for their consumption.
Key finding: The private sector can be a valuable partner in scaling innovations in some cases, but grantees 
often have limited capacity to engage with private sector actors.
Engaging the private sector as a partner in 
scaling innovations comes with risks, as 
benefits may accrue primarily to shareholders 
and products/innovations may be priced out of 
the reach of those with the lowest incomes. In 
other words, bringing in private actors can 
introduce conflicts of interest. Nonetheless, 
the evaluations suggest that the private sector 
can be usefully, and ethically, engaged in at 
least some circumstances.
ODI’s CIFSRF evaluation argues that the private 
sector is an essential partner for scaling up an 
innovation when a) the innovation is relatively 
simple to use, and b) the innovation has 
primarily private gains. Private gains are those 
in which the end user of the innovation 
receives the full benefit of the innovation even 
if no one else adopts it (i.e. minimal positive 
externalities), and does not have to share the 
benefit with other non-buyers (i.e. 
excludable). An example given in this 
evaluation is a millet thresher. When these 
criteria are met, all that may be required for 
scaling is for private actors (individuals, 
households, farms, firms, etc.) to be aware of 
the innovation and its benefit, know how to 
use it, and have access to it, and it will likely be 
rapidly scaled.
A number of programs engaged the private 
sector in scaling efforts (CARIAA, CultiAF, 
CIFSRF, IRCI, AIMS, CC, FEH), and there were 
some noteworthy examples of success: for 
instance, insurance companies adopting tools 
to assess climate change risk and resilience 
(CC), and pharmaceutical companies assisting 
in the scaling of the Ebola vaccine (FEH).
Some ways of overcoming these challenges 
were suggested by a few evaluations:
 Build grantees’ networks and capacity to 
engage with the private sector (DIF-H, CC). 
This was successful in the CC program, 
where it led to grantees training Morgan 
Stanley employees in the use of climate 
change risk and resilience tools to inform 
their investment decisions. In particular, 
grantees need training in packaging their 
results in a private-sector-friendly format
such as a business case; traditional 
research papers are difficult for private 
sector actors to engage with and to 
operationalize.
 Private businesses should be sought as 
research partners rather than just funders; 
approaching them only as potential funders 
only can alienate them, and means that the 
knowledge generated will be less well 
positioned for use (CC).
 Businesses with strong social and 
environmental responsibility (e.g. 
certified B Corps) can be engaged (CC), in 
order to allay grantees’ understandable 
concerns about whether the partnership 
will be used for the public good. This 
approach was successful in the B 
Corporations in LAC Project within the CC 
program.
 Require a business case as a deliverable. 
This has been done in CIFSRF’s 6th Call for 
Proposals, but it is too early to assess the 
success of this.
Most of the evaluations (e.g. CC, CultiAF, CIFSRF, CARIAA, 
GJ, ICURA, DIF-H) found that it was too early to fully assess 
the extent to which the research being conducted would 
or could be brought to scale. These evaluations had to 
instead assess likely future scalability. Note that this issue 
is cited frequently not just in formative evaluations, but in 
summative evaluations as well, so it is not simply an issue 
of an evaluation being conducted too early in the program 
lifecycle: even the end of the program lifecycle is often 
too early, as innovations may take a decade or more to 
scale.
Much the same was found regarding knowledge 
translation and policy influence more generally (e.g. in the 
TTI, IRCI, AIMS, and OD4D evaluations): evaluators needed 
to assess the likely future use of knowledge, how well 
positioned an individual leader or leading organization was 
to impact development in the future, and so forth.
None of this is surprising, as scaling, policy influence, 
building leaders, etc. takes time and the investments made 
are investments in the future. KT evaluation often uses 
measures of likely future influence, and IDRC’s Research 
Quality Plus (RQ+) framework includes “Positioning for 
Use” (comprising “knowledge accessibility and sharing” as 
well as “timeliness and actionability”) to assess the likely 
future influence of a piece of research.
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What is more interesting is how this early, prospective assessment can be 
made. Some of the evaluations showed some promising ways of determining 
the likelihood of future scaling:
 Asking the innovators, intended users of the innovation, or other 
knowledgeable stakeholders how likely they believe it is that the innovation 
can/will be brought to scale (or the research used, etc.). (Care needs to be 
taken here, however, as in some evaluations, such as ICURA, it seems that 
the evaluators asked these questions only of PIs and others who may have a 
vested interest in indicating likely future success. It is important to pose 
these questions to stakeholders with a more objective view – e.g. subject 
matter and regional experts, potential future users of the innovation or 
research who did not participate in its development, etc.)
 Private vs. public gains. This method is grounded in economic theory and 
was used by ODI’s CIFSRF evaluation. It assesses the likely future scalability 
of an innovation based on the extent to which the gains from the 
innovation are private or public. Private gains have minimal positive 
externalities and are excludable (e.g. millet thresher); innovations with 
primarily private gains are easy to scale, as individuals can adopt the 
innovation and gain full benefit from it without collective action. Public 
gains have significant positive externalities and are non-excludable (e.g. 
livestock vaccination). Innovations with primarily public gains are unlikely to 
scale up without public action (e.g. a policy requiring the innovation to be 
adopted, or widescale purchasing of the innovation by a government body). 
(Public intervention may be required even when gains are primarily private, 
if the innovation is not well known or understood or its proper use is 
complex.)
 Assessing whether a longstanding body (government agency, well 
established private firm/NGO, etc.) has taken on the task of scaling the 
innovation or using the research. ODI’s CIFSRF evaluation uses this 
technique.
 Culture of research impact. Assessing the likely future policy influence of an 
organization (e.g. a Think Tank) can be done by querying its “culture of 
research impact,” as was done in the TTI evaluation. Think Tanks were 
assessed in terms of five signs of a “culture of research impact” which 
derive from the DFID-ESRC Growth Research Programme; these signs 
include a focus on collaboration, co-creation, and an iterative approach; 
emphasizing local scholarship; networking activities; and quality of 
evidence.
Key finding: Evaluating scalability (and KT more generally) within project-funding timelines usually requires assessing likely future 
uptake. There are promising methods of assessing this in the programs included in this study.
2. Building leaders
Key finding: Deliberate mechanisms to build individual leaders and leading organizations are integrated 
into all programs in scope.
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Individual leaders that IDRC programs support can 
include researchers (graduate students, postdocs, 
established researchers) as well as policymakers, 
community members, and others. The individuals 
invested in are mainly from the Global South, but some 
are Canadian or are from other Northern countries. 
They may be either promising junior researchers 
(emerging research leaders) or more established 
researchers (who may nonetheless benefit from 
additional capacity building to increase their influence 
and visibility in policy circles). 
The basic way that IDRC programs build individual 
leaders is by engaging them in research projects – i.e. as 
grantees. This approach is implicit or explicit in every 
program that provides grants to research teams (e.g. 
CARIAA, SAIC, IMCHA, IRCI, JCIHRP). In many programs, 
a great number of emerging researchers are supported 
through post-graduate scholarships, and many of the 
research outputs that result from these programs are 
Master’s and Doctoral theses. Engaging early-career 
researchers as a project lead or co-lead (e.g. CIFSRF, 
CARIAA, GrOW, EG, SAIC, DIF-H, IRCI) is a way to build 
leadership capacity by putting emerging leaders into 
positions of greater responsibility, visibility, and 
prestige. Allowing early-career researchers to have first 
author credit on publications (when warranted) can 
also be helpful in building their reputations (CARIAA, 
GrOW).
Programs also build leadership capacity through 
training and education (e.g. CultiAF, SAIC, GJ, AIMS, 
CC), mentorship arrangements (e.g. CultiAF, GrOW, 
SAIC, GJ, DECI-2, INASSA), networking and peer 
learning opportunities (e.g. CultiAF, SAIC, DIF-H, IRCI, 
JCIHRP, CC), developing and enhancing postsecondary 
curriculum (e.g. CARIAA, ICURA), and creating new 
graduate programs (CC).
Leading organizations that IDRC programs support can 
be think tanks (CARIAA, INASSA, TTI), universities 
(CultiAF, CIFSRF, INASSA), or civil society organizations 
(GJ), and may be either established, emerging, or start-
up organizations.
Capacity building approaches for leading organizations 
include:
 Providing core funding (i.e. not earmarked for 
particular projects) for a set period of time (TTI) –
see page 14
 Providing project-specific funding (many IDRC 
programs)
 Providing flexible funding (i.e. additional, ad hoc 
funding to help the organization seize opportunities 
to scale up research or achieve policy influence) (e.g. 
CIFSRF, INASSA) – see pages 22-23
 Directly supporting organizational development 
(e.g. supporting the organization’s communications 
and evaluation capacity [DECI-2], funding workshops 
and retreats [TTI, OD4D])
 Helping organizations network and collaborate with 
each other (e.g. GJ, DECI-2, OD4D)
Through these measures, organizations expand their 
internal capacity as well as their networks, visibility, and 
reputation, all of which can lead to greater influence on 
policy and practice. 
Building individual leaders and building leading 
organizations are intertwined and mutually reinforcing, 
due to “reputational spillover” of organizations to their 
constituent members and vice-versa (CC).
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Key finding: The “greenhouse” approach (holistic, 
wraparound, on-site support) to building emerging leaders 
may be particularly effective.
The AIMS program trialed a unique model of capacity-building for 
emerging research leaders: a “greenhouse” approach in which 
promising students from African countries receive 24/7 holistic 
support while completing a Master’s degree at one of the AIMS 
campuses. There are two key aspects of this model:
 Wraparound supports. The students live on campus and have 
continuous tutoring supports, as well as ample opportunity to 
socialize and network with other students.
 Holistic, applied approach. Students attend a variety of courses 
beyond just pure mathematics and mathematical sciences.  
They learn applied mathematics, life skills, employment skills, 
job search skills, and business and entrepreneurship. Many of 
their theses pertain to topics with direct relevance to 
development, including climate, energy, environment, finance, 
and health. They are matched with co-op and internship 
opportunities that build their ability to influence Africa’s 
development trajectory.
Although undoubtedly expensive, this approach does seem to have 
borne fruit, in terms of developing the networks, qualifications, 
and skills (both hard and soft) of promising young Africans in 
applied mathematics. In the estimation of Cathexis, it may be 
worth exploring the possibility of replicating this model in other 
locations (outside Africa) and/or other subject matters (beyond 
mathematical sciences).
Key finding: North-South research teams benefit both sides. 
Equality is essential, and IDRC has found ways to ensure it.
A number of programs in scope (e.g. CIFSRF, GrOW, IMCHA, IRCI, 
ICURA, DIF-H, JCIHRP) deliberately built research teams comprised 
of researchers from both high-income countries (often Canada, 
but also the UK, Israel, and others) and low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs). This model proved to be successful, with both 
sides benefitting: in particular, Northern researchers gained 
knowledge and appreciation of on-the-ground realities and 
development issues in LMICs, and Southern researchers gained in 
their reputation and visibility through their association with 
Northern researchers.
It is essential for this North-South partnership to be equal, 
founded on mutual respect, and free from paternalistic 
assumptions that the Northern researcher will teach the Southern 
researcher and not learn from him/her (CIFSRF, ICURA, IRCI). 
Indeed, it is important to note that the Northern researcher is not 
always more senior than the Southern researcher: either 
arrangement (emerging Northern researcher partnered with 
established Southern researcher, established Northern researcher 
partnered with emerging Southern researcher) can work well 
(IRCI).
The IRCI and ICURA projects (both under the Foundations for 
Innovations core program) took deliberate measures to ensure the 
equality of the partnerships: the Canadian co-PI and LMIC co-PI 
had separate budgets that they controlled and were accountable 
for. (This is enabled by the fact that IDRC, unlike some other 
grantmakers, is allowed to directly grant to Southern institutions 
rather than flowing the funds through Northern institutions.) This 
seems to have been successful at ensuring equality, though it did 
lead to an increased reporting and administrative burden. 
Several evaluations (CIFSRF, GrOW, IRCI) found that North-South 
collaborations were most successful when there was a clear 
complementarity of roles between the two partners.
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Key finding: Core funding can provide the predictability and 
flexibility needed for leading organizations to build their own 
capacity
TTI provided up to a decade of funding ($500k to $2.5m) for 43 
think tanks in 20 countries. This was core funding, not earmarked 
for specific projects. That said, this was not an unconditional cash 
transfer: the organizations were monitored and provided with 
various capacity-building supports on research skills, policy 
engagement, and communications.
This model was highly effective at giving these organizations the 
opportunity to build their own capacity. Depending on the level of 
maturity of the organization and its context, this ranged from mere 
institutional survival (maintaining basic functioning through difficult 
political or financial circumstances) to institutional transformation 
(becoming recognized as a significant policy influencer or thought 
leader). 
The main advantage of core funding that the TTI evaluation 
identified was its flexibility. Grantees were able to nimbly seize 
opportunities as they presented themselves, since their funding did 
not oblige them to pursue specific, predetermined activities. Core 
funding also lent much-needed stability and predictability to 
organizations so that they could focus their attention on building 
capacity, doing high-quality research, and influencing the 
development agenda, rather than on financial survival. Core funding 
also allowed the organizations to be (and to appear to be) more 
independent and objective. They no longer needed to rely so 
heavily on research commissions (i.e. consulting work) for clients 
that might have a vested interest in the results. This increased 
policymakers’ trust in the think tanks and, thus, their ability to 
influence policy.
As the TTI evaluation explains, the risk with core funding (as with 
any cash transfer) is that organizations may become dependent and 
lose the skills needed to ensure continued funding past the period 
of the grant. This did not seem to occur in the TTI-supported 
institutions. This may owe to: the recipients being well selected; 
effective monitoring of the recipients; and/or effective additional 
supports for the organizations. As an additional accountability 
mechanism, recipients needed to submit a second application for 
their second five-year period of core funding: this resulted in a few 
organizations no longer receiving the funds.
Key finding: Sustaining leadership beyond the grant period 
requires increasing grantees’ capacity to secure their own 
funding, but the results of this effort have been uneven
Many programs (e.g. CIFSRF, GJ, IMCHA, TTI, IRCI, AIMS) aim to 
increase grantees’ capacity to secure their own funding from other 
sources, or to find permanent employment. This is essential if 
leadership is to be sustained beyond the period of the IDRC grant.
The results of these efforts have been mixed. In GJ, less than half of 
a sample of projects are making promising progress in securing 
additional funding. TTI did not result in dependency (as was feared 
might happen), but neither did it lead to much progress towards 
sustainability beyond the IDRC funding: many of the think tanks will 
need to downsize or rely on commissioned work that could threaten 
their flexibility, stability, and independence.
The evaluations do not give much insight into how this situation 
could be rectified, beyond pointing out that sustainability and 
resource mobilization plans should be given more attention and be 
more integrated into IDRC programs and grant applications from the 
outset. ICURA and IRCI seem to have been more successful in this 
area, but it is not clear how they achieved this. This is an area that 
IDRC should continue to explore through its evaluations.
Also see key finding re: the consortium model (page 22) – a 
promising way of increasing the international visibility of 
organizations and building their experience and networks.
3. Being the partner of choice
Key finding: Being the partner of choice can mean being the 
funder of choice (from grantees’ perspective) or the co-funder 
of choice (from other funders’ perspective). Both are important, 
and mutually reinforce each other.
In the evaluations in scope, it was observed that being the partner of 
choice can be interpreted in two different ways: 
1. The funder of choice: From grantees’ perspective, IDRC being the 
partner of choice means that it is a uniquely appealing donor to be 
funded and supported by.
2. The co-funder of choice: From the perspective of funders other 
than IDRC, IDRC being the partner of choice means that it is a 
uniquely appealing donor with whom to co-initiate, co-design, 
and co-fund a program, or to whom to give day-to-day 
administrative responsibilities for the program.
Being the funder of choice and being the co-funder of choice are 
interrelated, as being the funder of choice increases the quality of 
applicants, results in higher-quality research, and therefore ultimately 
leads to IDRC being seen as the co-funder of choice.
This section will use the terminology above to make clear which type of 
partnership is being referred. (Note that this understanding of the 
concept of “being the partner of choice” was developed by the Cathexis 
team based on a consideration of multiple evaluations in scope; it did 
not come directly from any specific evaluation.)
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Key finding: IDRC’s flexibility (including funding 
flexibility) can make it the funder of choice.
IDRC’s flexibility in budgeting, timelines, deliverables, and 
research foci is greatly valued by grantees (GJ, JCIHRP, CC, 
FEH). This flexibility allows research themes and knowledge 
translation (KT) strategies to arise organically (CARIAA, GJ, 
CC) and allows grantees to seize opportunities as they arise 
(CIFSRF, INASSA, TTI, FEH). Grantees appreciate that IDRC, 
unlike many of its peers, allows funding to be put towards 
visas, travel expenses, and tuition (JCIHRP). This can make 
IDRC an attractive organization to be funded by.
Some evaluations also pointed to IDRC’s flexible funding 
mechanisms as making it a uniquely attractive organization 
to be funded by. The INASSA evaluation noted that “Grantees 
referred to IDRC as the only funder providing the flexibility to 
seize policy windows through a Rapid Response Program” 
(i.e. opportunity funds) (INASSA, pg. 30). 
This flexibility is made possible by the unusually high degree 
of trust that exists between IDRC and its grantees (CIFSRF, 
TTI, INASSA) – see page 24 for a further consideration of this 
important strength.
Key finding: IDRC’s Grants+ approach (extensive 
supports to grantees) can make it the funder (and co-
funder) of choice.
The Grants+ approach refers to the fact that IDRC provides 
more than just funding to its grantees: it works closely and 
collaboratively with its grantees to help shape the research 
projects, build research capacity, provide technical support, 
connect grantees to each other and to important third 
parties, assist in policy influence and uptake, synthesize 
results across projects, and many other supports.
These supports are largely provided by IDRC’s Program 
Officers (POs) (GJ, CultiAf, EG, SAIC, TTI, DECI, CIFSRF, 
IMCHA). Research Support Projects are another mechanism 
to support grantees, especially with policy influence (GJ, CC, 
IMCHA, DECI-2).
These supports are frequently cited in evaluations (and by 
grantees themselves) as a key enabler of success (CC, GJ, 
CultiAf, EG, SAIC, TTI, DECI, CIFSRF, IMCHA, DECI-2, FEH). The 
TTI evaluation noted, “It cannot be emphasized enough that, 
without the continuous contact between grantees and [POs], 
the overall TTI approach would not have been viable. ” (TTI, 
pg. 27) As an approach that is unique to IDRC, Grants+ makes 
the organization both a funder and co-funder of choice
(CultAF, CIFSRF).
The Grants+ approach is made possible by the fact that IDRC 
POs have deep knowledge of research and development, 
and are not simply grant administrators (FEH). It is also made 
possible by the amount of time that POs are able to devote 
to each grantee, which is rare among development donors 
(CIFSRF). It will be necessary to maintain these practices if 
the dividends of the Grants+ approach are to continue paying 
out.
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Key finding: Co-funding and parallel funding arrangements each have advantages and 
disadvantages. Further investigation in this area is needed.
IDRC’s donor partnerships come in two types: co-funding and parallel funding. Cathexis’ 
understanding of the distinction is shown in the diagram below:
In other words, in co-funding relationships, funding for the program is provided by IDRC and 
another donor and the program is administered and implemented by IDRC; the grantees are 
accountable to IDRC. In parallel funding relationships, the funding is provided by IDRC and another 
donor, but each is separately administering the grants; the grantees are accountable to both 
donors.
Despite all efforts, it was difficult for the Cathexis team to learn a great deal about the relative 
merits of these two funding schemes. This was because evaluations often did not identify lessons 
learned about donor partnerships. When they did identify lessons, these lessons sometimes 
conflated co-funding and parallel funding mechanisms. Moreover, definitions of co- and parallel 
funding were used inconsistently in evaluations.
Some isolated findings that the Cathexis team did uncover related to the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of co-funding vs. parallel funding are summarized below:
 Co-funding represents a more intimate relationship between IDRC and the other donor, so it 
can help to forge and consolidate broad strategic partnerships (GJ).
 Parallel funding does not require such a close relationship, so it can open the door to a more 
diverse set of partner organizations (GJ). In FEH, a transnational consortium of donors tackling 
antimicrobial resistance allowed IDRC to understand how these donors were approach other 
issues, such as non-communicable diseases.
 Co-funding relationships can introduce restrictions on IDRC’s usual flexibility with the terms of 
its grants, due to policies of the co-funder. In CC, this did not turn out to be a major problem, 
but grantees did express frustration about restrictions on travel (the evaluation does not make 
it clear whether it was IDRC or another donor that imposed these restrictions).


















4. Integrating gender and equity considerations into programming
Key finding: Gender considerations, dimensions of equity beyond gender, and an intersectional approach to gender 
have often not been systematically integrated into programs and their evaluations, but there is evidence that this 
is improving. 
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Many IDRC programs and their evaluations have 
attempted to integrate gender, but often not in a deep or 
systematic way (CIFSRF, GJ, TTI, IRCI, OD4D, INASSA). For 
example, research within a project may focus on increasing 
access to economic opportunities for women, but this same 
project could be found to have a highly imbalanced gender 
composition in its research team or have few resources 
allocated to gender expertise within the team (CIFSRF). 
Other projects (and their evaluations) appear to have 
focused almost entirely on gender parity in research teams, 
a shallower approach that lends itself to mere inclusion as 
opposed to equity (JCIHRP). Evaluation reports often 
appeared to be using different definitions or have different 
understandings of what level of gender integration was 
appropriate: some evaluations focused on inclusion, while 
others held equity as the standard.
Similarly, dimensions of equity beyond gender (which may 
include age, (dis)ability, income/class/caste, nationality, 
ethnicity, language, sexual orientation, gender 
identity/expression, and vulnerability e.g. to climate change) 
were generally not deeply addressed in programs or their 
evaluations. An intersectional lens was usually not 
employed: where gender was included, it was sometimes 
understood to mean women as a homogenous group rather 
than e.g. rural women, low-income women, elderly women, 
etc. (CARIAA). Age (generational equity) is one of the few 
non-gender dimensions of equity considered in multiple 
evaluations, but this is generally understood in the narrow 
sense of including youth (CultiAf, EG, GJ, AIMS). The AIMS 
evaluation was unique in specifically assessing the degree of 
equity in terms of disability, nationality, ethnicity, language, 
income, age, and religious affiliation, in addition to gender. 
Note that in many cases it was difficult to assess whether 
the program did not fully integrate equity issues, or whether 
the evaluation did not, or both. There is probably room to 
encourage a broadened equity lens both in evaluations and 
in the programs that are evaluated.
Several recent evaluations, however, highlight the trend 
toward a more thorough integration of equity 
considerations in IDRC programming and evaluation:
 The CC program (evaluation completed in 2019) included 
a Gender Call for Proposals, and the CC portfolio includes 
some projects which are exemplary in their systematic 
integration of a gender-transformative approach into the 
research project.
 The FEH evaluation (2019) included examples of women 
being recruited both as a research subjects and as 
members of research teams, integrating gender into 
methodology (e.g. population surveys), and including a 
gender specialist on research teams.
 The CRVS program (evaluation completed in 2019) 
began with little consideration of gender, and then 
dramatically turned around issue in 2017, becoming an 
exemplar of gender sensitivity (e.g. organizing a Global 
Conference on Gender and CRVS).
 The IMCHA program (evaluation completed in October 
2018) required gender integration from the Call for 
Proposals process onwards.
These evaluations may be a sign that the federal 
government’s Feminist International Assistance Policy 
(FIAP), launched in June 2017, is now bearing fruit. 
The FEH and CC evaluations also included some 
consideration of socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and 
general vulnerability, though gender was the dimension of 
equity that received the most extensive investigation. 
CIFSRF is another relatively recent evaluation (2018) that 
paid attention to equity considerations, specifically 
income/socioeconomic status, as it attempted to target low-
income individuals and small-scale farmers. 
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Ways to more thoroughly integrate gender and equity 
into programs and evaluations
There are a number of ways that equity gaps found in some 
earlier programs, projects, and evaluations could be addressed, 
including:
 Providing researchers more guidance on incorporating 
gender into research design (GJ, INASSA) (including 
clarifying the difference between inclusion and equity). 
IDRC-facilitated workshops were found to be an effective 
tool for training grantees in gender integration in the FEH 
evaluation, and for allowing them to learn from each other.
 Emphasizing gender and equity in Calls for Proposals (CC), 
which may mean that gender experts are engaged early in 
research design (GJ, CARIAA).
 Including gender and equity as specific evaluation 
questions.
The evaluation of the GrOW program showcases a number of 
gender-inclusive methods used in its constituent projects, e.g.: 
a participatory approach that allowed storytelling from 
participants; respect for the safety and timing/location of 
meetings for all participants; and gender paired data collection 
and analysis. 
5. Designing programs for collaboration, learning and synthesis
Key finding: Most IDRC programs in scope are deliberately designed to support collaboration, 
learning, and synthesis. IDRC has experimented with a variety of ways of supporting this.
IDRC does not simply fund a disparate collection of research projects, but deliberately works to set up structures 
that allow the research teams to learn from each other and synthesize their results into broader knowledge and 
insights. IDRC has experimented with many mechanisms to support this, with complex but generally positive 
results. Some of the notable models are as follows (note that the terms below are not always used consistently):
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 Networks. Deliberate, but less formalized 
connections between research teams, researchers, 
and research institutions. They may be built 
through meeting other researchers at conferences 
[TTI, ICURA, OD4D] or IDRC-hosted inception 
meetings [e.g. IRCI, ICURA]. When they are more 
formal (e.g. with a coordinating institution as in 
INASSA) they become consortia. Others could be 
termed Communities of Practice (CC).
 North-South research teams (e.g. CIFSRF, IRCI, 
ICURA, IMCHA, DIF-H, JCIHRP). Research teams are 
composed of researchers from high-income 
countries (e.g. Canada) as well as researchers from 
LMICs. A research project may have two co-PIs, one 
from a high-income country and one from a LMIC. 
(See page 13 for a consideration of this model.)
 Researcher-practitioner research teams (e.g. 
ICURA, IMCHA, GJ). All projects work to bridge the 
gap between research and action, but some do so 
from the outset of the research by bringing a 
practitioner (e.g. policymaker, civil society leader) 
as a research partner. (See page 26 for a 
consideration of this model.)
 Cohort in the stronger sense (GJ). Research 
projects share common research questions and 
proceed on the same (or similar) timelines, with 
formal touchpoints throughout.
 Cohort in the weaker sense (referred to as 
“clusters” in the GJ evaluation) (e.g. CultiAF, EG, 
SAIC, IMCHA, JCIHRP). Research projects share 
common themes, but not common research 
questions or timelines.
 Hotspot approach (CARIAA). Multiple research 
projects share a common geographical region of 
focus, chosen for being particularly vulnerable to a 
specific threat (in CARIAA’s case, climate change).
 Consortium (CARIAA). A group of institutions 
partner in order to collaborate on research, with a 
single PI at the lead institution, and co-PIs at a small 
number of key partner institutions. In CARIAA, 
there were multiple consortia that also learned 
from each other, creating a consortium-of-
consortia model.
 Centre of Excellence (CRVS, OD4D). A regional or 
global hub tasked with promoting and supporting 
research on a particular issue, facilitating its 
translation into policy, and making available the 
evidence that results.
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Key finding: Common research questions and timelines (a “cohort” in the strong sense) may be particularly effective at 
leading to collaboration, learning, and synthesis.
This approach was highly successful in the GJ program. It 
resulted in:
 Increased research quality due to sharing of know-how 
between research teams;
 Increased South-South learning more generally;
 The accumulation of larger, triangulated bodies of 
evidence with greater ability to convince policymakers
and impact the development agenda;
 The creation of unified bodies of knowledge that could 
have influence and scale beyond national levels to the 
regional, cross-continental, or even global level. (Actual 
impact is yet to come, but the signs are promising.)
 A cost-effective vehicle for capacity building (at least 
compared to other models), as all of the research teams 
in the cohort attend workshops at the same time.
Cohorts in this sense do have drawbacks and challenges. 
They require a great deal of coordination, which is time-
consuming for POs. Meetings between the research teams 
may not be as frequent as desired, and collaboration may be 
stymied by language barriers. Finally, financial barriers may 
make it. difficult for the research projects to start and 
finish on the same schedule. Still, given the significant 
benefits outlined above, most stakeholders in the GJ 
evaluation felt that the benefits outweighed the costs.
The CC program provides an interesting counterpoint. Unlike 
GJ, the CC program developed organically and ad hoc out of 
past programs, with projects beginning at different times. 
This resulted in a program described as a “bricolage.” While 
there were successful examples of cross-project learning 
and collaboration, these happened at a smaller scale. It 
seems there is a trade-off between flexibility (necessary to 
seize emerging opportunities) and rigidity (necessary to 
create more unified bodies of knowledge).
The GJ program is designed around cohorts (e.g. Youth 
Violence; Land; Early Childhood Forced Marriage) with the 
following characteristics:
 The cohorts are composed of multiple projects 
conducted by separate research teams (up to 13). These 
may be multiple research teams that responded to a Call 
for Proposals, or may be brought together by POs at 
IDRC.
 The research projects share the same research 
questions; these are determined collaboratively, with 
the leadership of IDRC POs. (For instance, the Youth 
Africa 2016 cohort’s common question was “How can 
formal and informal responses to conflict, violence, and 
injustice create the potential for or obstruct the 
development of safer spaces for youth?”) They may be 
organized around a single region of interest, or may cross 
regions.
 The research projects also share a common approach to 
knowledge synthesis, communication, and translation 
into action. 
 The research projects share timelines to the extent 
possible (this is not always possible).
 The research teams work collaboratively with each and 
meet in person at key touchpoints (joint workshops at 
beginning, middle, and end)
 The cohort is supported by POs at IDRC, as well as (often, 
but not always) a coordinator and synthesis lead, which 
may be one of the grantee organizations or an external 
body chosen specifically for this purpose.
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Key finding: Consortia can foster collaboration across 
boundaries, create convening power and build individual 
leaders and leading organizations.
CARIAA employed a consortium model, with the following 
characteristics:
 Institutions partner together as a community of practice, to 
collaborate on research. These institutions span multiple countries 
(up to six), usually multiple regions, multiple types of institutions 
(universities, civil society, think tanks, both Northern and Southern 
organizations), and researchers from multiple disciplines.
 Although dozens of institutions can be part of a consortium, one 
institution is the lead (with the PI) and several others are 
considered key partners (each with a co-PI).
 The consortium is organized around a common name and brand, 
common development issue (e.g. climate change-induced 
displacement in river deltas), and common geographical area(s) 
(e.g. river deltas in South Asia and West Africa).
 There were multiple consortia, and these consortia were 
themselves linked to each other, creating a consortium of 
consortia.
This model proved to be very successful. Organizations within consortia 
learned to collaborate with each other across cultural, linguistic, and 
organizational lines; shared research methodologies that they had 
previously kept secret due to competition for funding and publication; 
increased their networks, reputation, and international visibility; and 
elevated the quality of their research to a global standard. The 
consortia allowed research to be conducted across disciplinary lines, 
and between countries that share climate change vulnerabilities but are 
in conflict with each other (e.g. India and Pakistan). All of this created 
“convening power” and positioned the organizations for greater 
influence. The quality of research output was rated as “very good” 
according to the RQ+ framework, and several examples of specific 
policy influence were found. In the estimation of the Baastel team (the 
authors of the evaluation report), these linkages and partnerships will 
likely continue even when CARIAA funding ends.
As in any ambitiously collaborative endeavor, there were challenges in 
managing such large and complex research teams and in working across 
disciplinary boundaries. The demands on consortium leaders (PIs) are 
heavy, amounting to 3-4 days per month in management and 
coordination, over and above conducting research.
Key finding: In-person meetings between grantees are 
valuable for fostering cross-project and South-South learning.
Cross-project learning and South-South learning have often been less 
strong than North-South learning (CIFSRF, GrOW, INASSA, IRCI). In-
person meetings between grantees can help overcome this challenge 
(FEH, CARIAA, IRCI, ICURA). These may be Annual Learning Reviews 
(CARIAA), inception meetings (e.g. IRCI, ICURA), or workshops at 
project beginning, middle, and end (GJ cohorts). In all cases, these 
were seen as very valuable. Often, stakeholders wished for more 
such opportunities (IRCI, INASSA).
The hotspot approach
Another way to understand the collaboration model of CARIAA (see 
key finding to the left) is as a hotspot approach. CARIAA built 
consortia around not just research themes (particular vulnerabilities 
to climate change) but around specific geographical areas and types 
of landscapes (e.g. specific river deltas in South Asia and West Africa, 
glacier- and snowpack-dependent regions of the Himalayas, semi-
arid regions of Asia and Africa). This was seen as a key enabler of the 
success of this program, and helped otherwise disparate groups of 
partners (spanning disciplines, countries, continents, institution 
types) to collaborate around a common focus. This was especially 
impressive when the countries involved are in conflict with each 
other: for example, India and Pakistan can find common ground in 
their shared vulnerability to climate change in the Himalayas and 
associated watersheds.
Obviously, the issue of climate change lends itself well to a hotspot 
approach, in a way that not all other development issues would. But 
it is worth considering whether the hotspot approach could be a 
useful organizing principle in other, non-climate-change-related 
programs. For instance, consortia (or other types of collaborations) 
could be built around geographical hotspots for diseases or natural 
disasters.
6. Building flexibility into IDRC programs through funding mechanisms
Key finding: Opportunity funds and synergy funds work well to keep 
programs nimble.
“Opportunity” and “synergy” funds refer to additional grants given to 
grantees to extend or expand their work, or to take advantage of emerging 
opportunities (e.g. GJ, CIFSRF, TTI, INASSA). (Note that the “opportunity” and 
“synergy” terms are not consistently used across programs/evaluations; we 
use the terms here for convenience.) For instance:
 In CIFSRF, innovations that showed promise were supported with scale-up 
funding.
 In TTI, grants (beyond core funding) were provided to think tanks on a 
flexible basis to support emerging needs such as networking, joint 
research projects, and capacity building for engagement with government 
(“do-tank” activities).
 In INASSA, a “Rapid Response Program” provided additional funds to 
grantees to allow them to respond to unexpected requests from 
policymakers for technical assistance.
 In IMCHA, “Synergy Grants” were provided to high-performing grantees 
to research additional innovations or to explore the possibility of scaling 
up innovations they had already developed. Synergy Grants also helped 
IMCHA research teams to more fully integrate gender into their work to 
accommodate with the increased emphasis on gender when the Trudeau 
government came into power.
In each case, these flexible funds appear to have been successful at 
supporting knowledge translation and mobilization. It will be important to 
continue offering such grants in the future.
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Key finding: In the programs reviewed, there are other promising 
funding mechanisms that facilitate flexibility.
Beyond opportunity and synergy funds, programs have experimented with 
a variety of other flexible funding mechanisms that have shown promise:
 Core (non-earmarked) funding for organizations. This was a key enabler 
in the TTI program. Although the amount of funding itself is not flexible, 
the uses to which the funding is put are flexible. See page 14 for more 
information.
 Midterm reapplication for funding. TTI and CIFSRF were designed as 
two-phase projects in which only a subset of grantees in the first phase 
would continue to receive grants in the second phase. This gave IDRC 
the flexibility to continue funding the more promising projects, while 
discontinuing funding for less promising projects.
 Moving items across budget lines. The GJ and JCIHRP evaluations 
identified the PO’s willingness and authorization to redistribute grant 
funds across line items as a key enabler of program nimbleness. This 
allowed grantees to respond to emerging stakeholder priorities and 
ensure that a wide variety of stakeholders’ priorities could addressed.
 Redirection of funds within a portfolio. One notable example is the 
quick redirection of funds within the FEH portfolio to address the Ebola 
crisis.
 Increasing the size of the investment based on quantity of high-quality 
proposals received. In SAIC’s Call for Proposals process, a larger-than-
expected number of high-quality proposals were received. This led IDRC 
to double and DFID to triple their investments, allowing for many more 
projects to be supported originally anticipated.
 Small grants. AIMS offers small grants to its students, for example for 
research and travel.
 Mobility Grants. These are not offered by IDRC but by the UK’s Newton 
Fund; they were described in the IRCI and ICRUA evaluations. Mobility 
Grants are relatively small grants that fund visits between potential 
research collaborators so that they can explore the possibility of future 
collaboration. Some evaluations pointed to the importance of selecting 
research teams/collaborators who having already worked with each 
other in the past (SAIC, IMCHA), but requiring applicants to have already 
worked together might be overly restrictive. Mobility Grants could be a 
good compromise, allowing potential collaborators to test the waters 
before they submit a full application for funding.
Key finding: Granter-grantee trust makes flexible 
funding work. IDRC excels at this.
The high level of trust that exists between IDRC and its 
grantees is identified in several evaluations as an essential 
enabler of success (CIFSRF, TTI, INASSA). The more flexibility 
IDRC allows—especially flexibility around funding—the 
more trust is required between IDRC POs and grantees, so 
that IDRC and grantees can have open conversations about 
what is working, what is not, and what implications this has 
for budgeting.
IDRC excels in this area (CIFSRF, TTI, INASSA). In the words 
of the authors of the INASSA evaluation, “There is an 
unavoidable power dynamic between those who are 
providing resources and influencing the direction of the 
work with those who are receiving the money and required 
to respond to the funder’s requirements, if they are to 
receive the funds. IDRC does an excellent job of building a 
safe, open relationship with their partners so that this 
dynamic does not play a strong role.” (INASSA, pg. 40)
7. Supporting knowledge translation and policy/practice influence
Key finding: IDRC works to facilitate knowledge translation and policy/practice influence in numerous ways.
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Select grantees based on their pre-existing capacity to influence 
policy. Evaluations point to the importance of grantees’ pre-existing 
policy capacity (CARIAA, CIFSRF, CC, GJ). For instance: in CARIAA, the 
pre-existing reputation and networks of the research institutions 
involved was key; in CIFSRF previous experience engaging with rural 
populations in the LMIC in question was essential; in CARIAA, CC, and 
GJ, an important enabler of policy influence was researchers’ pre-
existing personal contacts with policymakers.
Build grantees’ capacity to influence policy. This is essential when 
grantees are academics unaccustomed to conducting applied research, 
have yet to internalize the concept of research use (INASSA, CARIAA), or 
have limited experience engaging with policymakers (IRCI). For instance, 
chairholders in the IRCI program often had never worked with 
policymakers before, but through the IRCI program gained significant 
skills in this area. Capacity to influence policy can be built through any of 
the mechanisms listed on page 12. In building new relationships with 
policymakers, it is essential to have repeated, ideally face-to-face 
contact over the long-term (CIFSRF, GrOW, IMCHA, TTI, INASSA, EG).
Include a policymaker on the research team from the outset. This 
technique is especially promising, so it is discussed in more detail on the 
next page.
Support broad and diverse dissemination. Dissemination is not 
synonymous with influence and may not bear fruit, but by getting the 
research out to a wide variety of audiences in a wide variety of formats, 
the chance of the information getting in the right hands and having an 
influence is increased. Dissemination requires tailoring communication 
to the intended audience (CARIAA, FEH). Vehicles for dissemination 
include academic articles, theses, websites, blogs, social media, 
conference presentations, videos, theater, and business cases, and can 
be targeted at policymakers, community members, journalists, 
investors, firms, and donor organizations, in both the North and South.
IDRC research is meant to be used: “positioning for 
use” is a key part of IDRC’s RQ+ framework. 
Research and researchers funded by IDRC can 
influence policy and practice in a number of ways:
 Increasing the capacity of policymakers to 
make evidence-based decisions. For instance, 
CARIAA consortia developed climate change 
vulnerability and adaptation training courses 
for government officials. 
 Providing evidence to inform policy dialogues 
and decision-making processes. For instance, 
as part of the OD4D program, an Open Data 
Barometer, Index, and Impact Map were 
developed, which can be used by policymakers 
to benchmark their country’s readiness for and 
adoption of Open Data for Development 
policies.
 Directly influencing policies and decisions. For 
instance, INASSA-funded research was 
explicitly cited by policymakers as the reason 
for an information and communications 
technology policy being formulated, altered, or 
rejected in a LMIC.
 Influencing the activities of private 
individuals, households, and firms. For 
instance, some CultiAF projects led to local 
businesses changing their produce storage 
facilities to reduce contamination, and a fish 
processing center adopting practices that 
reduce post-harvest loss.
Across the evaluations, four ways that IDRC 
facilitates knowledge translation and 
policy/practice influence emerged – these are 
summarized in the boxes to the right.
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Key finding: Influence on policy and practice is sometimes best 
pursued through alternative policy spaces and nontraditional 
influencers. Some grantees need support in accessing these 
spaces.
Policymakers in the usual sense—i.e. politicians and public servants—
have political agendas and are constrained in many ways; they cannot 
always be counted upon to base their decisions on research (CARIAA, 
TTI). When they are unreceptive to evidence, it is essential to engage 
with “alternative niches of the policy sphere” (TTI) and “nontraditional 
influencers” (SAIC) beyond the government. For instance, grantees have:
 Engaged with city police (SAIC)
 Influenced the practices of private firms (CARIAA, CIFSRF, CC). For 
instance, insurance companies and investment firms adopted climate 
change risk assessment tools (CC). 
 Influenced household-level practices and decisions (GJ, IMCHA). This 
can be achieved by employing a participatory research approach (GJ, 
IMCHA) and/or by disseminating research results in non-traditional 
formats such as art and theatre (CARIAA, INASSA).
 Helped to shape public debate on an issue, ultimately creating a 
broader demand for a policy change that government was then 
obliged to respond to (TTI). This was the approach taken by FUSADES 
in El Salvador, a think tank funded under TTI. The organization’s 
earlier collaboration with the private sector made a new leftist 
government resistant to accepting any direct influence from the 
organization, so it worked instead to stoke public interest in pension 
reform through social media and multimedia communication with the 
public at large. This was successful and ultimately led to national 
legislative change.
The SAIC evaluation found that while some grantees had a broad and 
sophisticated understanding of policy influence (including alternate 
policy spaces like private firms, communities, etc.), others narrowly 
understood it as being synonymous with influencing government. 
Grantees with a narrower understanding may need support from IDRC to 
access less-obvious avenues of policy and practice influence (SAIC).
Key finding: Bringing the intended users of the 
research into the research team from the beginning 
may be the surest way to create research demand and 
maximize uptake.
It is essential to have sustained relationships with research 
users along the journey of the research, not just to 
communicate results to them at the end (CARIAA, OD4D, 
INASSA). Given this, a promising technique to ensure use is 
to involve research users as members of the research team
from the beginning (CARIAA, GrOW, EG, IMCHA, ICURA). 
Two programs/projects took this approach deliberately and 
systematically:
 In IMCHA, each of the 19 research teams included a co-PI 
who was a decisionmaker at the local, district, or national 
level in the country where the PI was located. The 
inclusion of these decisionmaker co-PIs was not a token 
gesture; they were indeed engaged as research partners, 
and seem to have been genuinely invested in the 
outcome of the research. This approach seems to be 
bearing fruit, with several concrete, if preliminary, 
examples of policy influence. The decisionmakers co-PIs 
add value by bringing knowledge of the local context and 
of government priorities. Although the approach was 
promising, there were challenges with turnover 
(turnover in government positions leading to turnover in 
co-PIs) and shifting government priorities. The 
arrangements worked best when there was frequent 
contact between the PI and co-PI.
 In ICURA, universities (researchers) were paired with civil 
society organizations (research users). This succeeded in 
broadening the scope of the research, fostering 
interdisciplinary collaboration, generating innovative 
research, and influencing policy.
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Key finding: The design of the Call for Proposals process can impact research quality and uptake. A two-stage Call for 
Proposals process with financial support to shortlisted applicants is a promising approach.
A good compromise between an open and closed Call for 
Proposals is a two-stage application process (ICURA, CultiAF). 
In the examples that the Cathexis team found, this was 
accompanied by small grants for shortlisted organizations to 
help them prepare their full application. For example:
 In ICURA, applicants first provided letters of intent. One in 
ten of these applicants was shortlisted and the organization 
invited to prepare a full application, with $30,000 given to 
support this effort.
 In CultiAF, a “Call for Concept Notes” generated 171 
applications, which was narrowed down to 11 promising 
applications. $5000 was paid to each shortlisted 
organization to travel to develop the proposal. Ultimately, 
just 5 were awarded the grant.
These schemes may help emerging researchers, and less well-
resourced individuals and organizations, compete effectively 
with more established applicants.
Several evaluations showed that an effective Call for Proposal 
process is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for policy 
and practice influence down the line. This makes it 
imperative for this process to be adequately resourced: 
when CIFSRF staff restructured the calls process to fund 
Technical Reviews, the breadth and quality of proposals 
increased.
The two basic types of calls—open and closed calls—each 
have advantages and disadvantages:
 Open calls lead to a wider variety of applicants, and open 
the door to unexpected applicants and novel research 
topics that IDRC may not have been aware of (IRCI, 
CultiAF, CIFSRF). They have the disadvantage of being very 
resource intensive, as many hundreds of proposals may 
need to be evaluated (GJ).
 Closed calls are less resource intensive, as fewer 
proposals need to be evaluated (GJ). They are also useful 
for targeting the most suitable researchers (GJ), which 
reduces wasted time and effort for other applicants. Their 
disadvantage is that they foreclose the possibility of 
unexpected applicants and novel research topics (IRCI, 
CultiAF, CIFSRF).
The key, it appears, is to tailor the type of Call for Proposals 
to the type of impact that the program intends to achieve. If 
the program intends to build the capacity of emerging 
leaders, it may be best to hold an open call to identify 
promising new applicants. If program is aimed at field-
building, it may be best to hold an open call to discover 
unknown researchers in a novel area of inquiry. If the 
primary goal is to support high-quality research in a defined 
and established area, it may be best to limit the proposals to 
researchers and organizations that are known quantities.
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Key finding: IDRC programs contribute to outcomes beyond policy influence. 
These include field building, thought leadership, and awareness raising of lesser-
known topics.
Programs in scope achieved a number of impacts which are less concrete than policy 
influence, but highly significant:
 Field-building, and putting topics on national, regional, and global agendas (CARIAA, 
CIFSRF, GJ, OD4D, CC, FEH). For instance, OD4D has helped to clarify the very concept 
of Open Data for Development and put it on the agenda in multiple countries. 
Similarly, CC helped to define the emerging concept of “energy justice.”
 Thought leadership (CIFSRF, GJ, CRVS, FEH). For instance, CRVS has established itself 
as a thought leader on the issue of civil registration and vital statistics, and the Rapid 
Research Fund for the Ebola Virus Diseases Outbreaks (part of FEH) led to significant 
thought leadership on issues of conflicts of interest in partnering with private 
corporations for development assistance.
 Awareness raising of lesser-known topics (CARIAA, CIFSRF, IRCI, ICURA, AIMS, OD4D, 
FEH). Awareness can be raised in both the North and the South, and among the 
general public as well as among specialized audiences such as Global Affairs Canada. 
For instance, CARIAA brought the links between climate change and migration to the 
attention of global organizations like the World Bank and the International 
Organization for Migration; AIMS has helped to generate greater interest in 
mathematical sciences as a career path and a contributor to development, among 
members of the public in the countries where AIMS has campuses.
 Contributing to the broader evidence base (e.g. CARIAA, GrOW, OD4D, CC). This is 
inherent in most of IDRC’s programs, in that they result in a great volume of peer-
reviewed academic literature. In certain programs, especially ones focused on new 
fields of research (e.g. OD4D for Open Data for Development) or on very specific sub-
fields (e.g. GrOW for Women’s Economic Empowerment), IDRC can make a large, even 
transformative, impact on the overall body of evidence.
8. Knowledge management
Key finding: Some programs lack clear, strategic 
knowledge management plans. This is a key gap.
The evaluations in scope suggest that many programs 
have not taken a systematic and strategic approach to 
knowledge management. For example, CARIAA, CRVS, 
and INASSA lack overarching knowledge management 
strategies, which limits dissemination of research 
results and their accessibility. Similarly, OD4D could 
make its research outputs more accessible to the public. 
This is a particularly unfortunate omission for programs 
that are themselves thematically related to transparency 
and accessibility of information (e.g. CRVS establishes a 
resource hub, OD4D promotes the cause of Open Data).
The INASSA evaluation authors suggest that IDRC fund a 
Research Support Project (in the vein of DECI-2) that 
works to build grantees’ capacity in the area of 
knowledge management. The INASSA evaluation also 
suggests mainstreaming knowledge management into 
IDRC programs through inclusion in Terms of Reference 
and Monitoring & Evaluation plans.
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Key finding: A useful resource hub for 
development research is accessible, well 
organized, quality-assured, and includes both 
country-specific and non-country-specific 
resources
The CRVS and OD4D evaluations put forth several best 
practices for creating a truly useful resource hub of 
development research:
 The resources must be easily accessible, for free or 
for a minimal cost
 Users of the resources should be granted reuse and 
redistribution rights
 The resources must be quality-assured, including 
being user-friendly
 The resources need to be well organized and 
properly categorized
 The resources need to include both country-specific 
case studies and operational (non-country-specific) 
research.
 A directory of experts on the issue at hand can be a 
valuable addition to the resource hub.
Topics for future evaluation and 
learning
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Topics for future evaluation and learning
This exercise highlighted several topics that could be fruitfully explored 
in future evaluations and other learning mechanisms; these topics are 
listed in the table on the following page.
Often, these were topics that few evaluations broached to any 
significant extent; in these cases, IDRC could consider including these 
topics as evaluation questions, to ensure they are explored. In other 
cases, systematic learning was limited by inconsistent terminology 
across evaluations; in these cases, IDRC could consider defining terms 
more clearly, or systematically clarifying the key dimensions on which 
the thing in question (e.g. flexible funding mechanism) can vary.
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Overarching area of 
interest
Topic for further exploration







1. Achieving impact 
at scale
Optimal scale and 
justification for scaling 
Optimal scale and justification are two of IDRC’s core 
principles of scaling, but evaluations in scope barely spoke to 
these considerations. (There is a brief reference in the IMCHA 
evaluation.)
2. Building leaders
Increasing grantees’ capacity 
to secure their own funding 
beyond the period of the 
IDRC grant

This topic was addressed in a number of evaluations, but 
these evaluations provided little indication of how to make 
efforts to increase grantees’ capacity in this area more 
successful.
3. Being the partner 
of choice
Co-funding partnerships: how 
they came to be, successes, 
challenges, enablers, barriers, 
lessons learned

Limited information was found in the evaluations. The CC 
evaluation also pointed to the lack of a learning system at 
IDRC related to developing and managing partnerships. 
Evaluation may not be the most appropriate vehicle for this 
learning, as the findings can be sensitive and high-stakes.
Co-funding vs. parallel 
funding arrangements: 
relative advantages and 
disadvantages
 
Evaluations often did not investigate how the funding 
arrangement impacted programs. Lessons learned sometimes 
conflated co-funding and parallel funding mechanisms, or 
used inconsistent definitions, making it difficult to learn about 
the relative advantages of each.




Equity considerations beyond 
gender (and a broader, 
intersectional gender lens)

These may include age, (dis)ability, 
income/class/caste/socioeconomic status, nationality, 







Ways of designing programs 
for collaboration, learning, 
and synthesis

Terms like “cohort” and “network” are used in different ways 
across evaluations and are not always clearly defined.
6. Building flexibility 
into IDRC programs 
through funding 
mechanisms
Flexible funding mechanisms 
The terms “opportunity funds” and “synergy funds” are not 
used consistently across programs/evaluations.
7. Supporting KT and 
policy/ practice 
influence
Designing Calls for Proposals: 
approaches, successes, 
challenges, enablers, barriers, 
lessons learned

A handful of evaluations discussed this in depth, but others 
mentioned it only in passing or not at all. Many evaluations 
did not provide basic information about Calls (e.g. whether 
they were open or closed).
Annexes
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Annex A: Evaluations in scope







CultiAF Evaluation of Cultivate Africa’s Future Fund (CultiAF) Universalia Summative 2016 Agriculture & 
Environment  -
Agriculture and Food 
Security




Evaluation of the Canadian International Food Security Research 
Fund (CIFSRF) Universalia Formative 2016 Program Global Affairs Canada (GAC) N/A
Understanding the CIFSRF Phase Two portfolio’s overall 
contribution to food security
Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) Summative 2018 Program GAC N/A






Mid-term evaluation of gender and social inclusion in the 
Collaborative Adaptation Research Inititative in Africa and Asia 
(CARIAA) consortia
Noémi Gonda Formative 2017 Program UK Dept. for International Development (DFID)
Sub-Saharan 
Africa; Asia
Collaborative adaptation research initiative in Africa and Asia 
(CARIAA): summative evaluation baastel Summative 2018 Program DFID
Sub-Saharan 
Africa; Asia
FEH External Review of IDRC’s Food, Environment, and Health (FEH) Program 2015-2020 – Final Report University of Toronto Summative 2019
Agriculture & 
Environment - Food, 
Environ. & Health
Program Various N/A
GrOW GrOW Formative Evaluation for Mid-Term Review Universalia Formative 2017 Inclusive Economies -
Employment and 
Growth
Program DFID Sub-Saharan Africa; Asia
EG Employment and Growth Learning Evaluation Sisters Ink Formative 2019 Program None N/A
SAIC
Safe and Inclusive Cities Program: formative mid-term evaluation 
report
Sustainable Livelihoods 




Safe and Inclusive Cities Final Evaluation Universalia Summative 2017
Program DFID N/A
GJ Governance and Justice Program Evaluation Universalia Formative 2019
Program None N/A
IMCHA Innovating for Maternal and Child Health in Africa: A Mid-Term Formative Evaluation Small Globe, Inc. Formative 2019 Inclusive Economies -Maternal and Child 
Health
Program
Canadian Institutes of 




CRVS Centre of Excellence for Civil Registration and Vital Statistics (CRVS) Systems Mid-term Evaluation Raj Gautam Mitra Formative 2019 Program GAC N/A
TTI External Evaluation of the Think Tank Initiative (TTI) Phase Two, 2014-2019 NIRAS Summative 2019
Inclusive Economies -
Think Tank Initiative Program
Gates Foundation; Hewlett 
Foundation; UK Aid; Norad N/A








IRCI Summative evaluation: IRCI; a review of the International Research Chairs Initiative (IRCI) Small Globe, Inc. Summative 2015 Project None N/A
ICURA Summative evaluation: ICURA; a review of the International Community-University Research Alliance Small Globe, Inc. Summative 2015 Project None N/A
AIMS African Institute for Mathematical Sciences Next Einstein Initiative final evaluation
MDF Training & 
Consultancy Summative 2017 Program DFID
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
JCIHRP Program Evaluation of the Joint Canada-Israel Health Research Program (JCIHRP) Technopolis Group Formative 2019 Program
Azrieli Foundation; CIHR; 
Israel Science Foundation N/A





OD4D Evaluation of the Open Data for Development Program: final report OD4D Network Summative 2017 Program The World Bank; GAC; DFID N/A
INASSA Evaluation of the Information and Networks in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (INASSA) Program Kallick Russell Consulting Formative 2018 Program DFID
Sub-Saharan 
Africa; Asia

















































































Annex B: Evaluations in scope – by key attributes
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IDRC documents
 Investing in Solutions: Strategic Plan 2015-2020
 Research Quality Plus: A Holistic Approach to Evaluating 
Research (2016)
 Evaluation at IDRC (2017)
 Knowledge to Policy: Making the Most of Development 
Research (2009)
 Standardized Indicators for Strategic Objective 1: Invest in 
Knowledge and Innovation for Large-Scale Positive Change
 Standardized Indicators for Strategic Objective 2: Build the 
leaders for today and tomorrow
 Mapping IDRC’s Efforts to Build Emerging Research Leaders 
(DRAFT) (2018)
 Investing in solutions: Partnership Implementation Plan 
2015-2020
 Strategic approaches to engage the private sector: Report 
to the Board of Governors (2017)
 Exploration Report: IDRC’s position as a leader: driving 
knowledge translation and synthesis to champion Southern 
contributions in sustainable development (2019)
 Scaling Science at IDRC: Internal Findings Brief (2018)
Other documents
 Gargani, J. and R. McLean 2017. Scaling Science. Stanford 
Social Innovation Review Fall 2017.
 Universalia 2018. Evaluation of IDRC’s Contribution to Building 
Leading Organisations: Final Report.
 Sisters Ink 2018. Gender-Transformative Research: Lessons 
from the International Development Research Centre 
(DRAFT).
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